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Comments and Casenotes
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF REDUCTION IN
STATE PROPERTY TAX
By

HERBERT M. BRUNE, JR.*

Reduction or repeal of the State property tax appears
likely to rank as one of the vital questions in State affairs.1
Apart from reasons of political or economic policy, for discussion of which the REVIEW would not be the proper forum,
two legal or constitutional grounds have been advanced for
the view that early repeal of the tax cannot be accomplished.
These are, first, that the State has contracted with its bondholders not to repeal the tax until outstanding bonds are
retired, and, second, that the taxes on certain gross receipts
of utilities depend for their validity on the fact that they are
substitutes for a State property tax, so that repeal of the
general property tax would render these taxes unconstitutional.
State ConstitutionalProvision
All bonds of the State issued since the Constitution of
1851 have been authorized by laws calling for the levy of
taxes to cover interest and amortization on such bonds.
Apart from road bonds which are serviced by the gasoline
tax2a and certain recent issues which are serviced by inheritance taxes, the outstanding funded indebtedness of the
State' has been issued under legislation calling for the levy
of State property taxes, the maximum rate of 23.35 cents
to be reached in 1939."
The Constitutional provision authorizing and requiring
such legislation reads as follows:
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1922, Williams College; LL.B., 1925.
Harvard University; Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland
School of Law; Assistant Editor of the REiw.
1 Editorial, "State Realty Tax," Baltimore Sun, Nov. 13, 1937.
Md. Const., Art. III, Sec. 34 (as amended by Acts, 1924, Chap. 327, ratified November 4, 1924) ; Const. 1851, Art. III, Sec. 22; Const. 1864, Art. III,
See. 33.
2a Not issued on the general credit of the State.
Expected to be about $52,000,000 as of the close of the year 1937.
According to the Budget submitted by Governor Nice to the 1937 regular

session of the Assembly, "loan taxes" on property in the amount of
$5,288,662.50 were to be required in 1939 to service outstanding bonds.
Additional bonds in the amount of $10,052,000 were authorized by the
Assembly in 1937; $3.971,000 in principal amount of bonds were retired.
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"No debt shall be hereafter contracted by the General Assembly unless such debt shall be authorized by
a law providing for the collection of an annual tax or
taxes sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it
falls due, and also to discharge the principal thereof
within fifteen years from the time of contracting the
same; and the taxes laid for this purpose shall not be
repealed or applied to any other object until the said
debt and interest thereon shall be fully discharged." '
It is matter of public record that diversions of the annuity bond fund, as it is called, to general purposes have
occurred on several occasions during the recent difficult
years in State finances.'
Presumably these diversions
were unconstitutional,7 but no proceedings were undertaken
to enjoin them. The fund has subsequently been restored,'
and, according to latest reports, is now intact.
It is plain that outright repeal of the tax would be a
violation of the terms of the Constitutional provision, even
if coupled with the levy of a sufficient substitutional tax. If,
however, the tax is not repealed, but the levy is merely suspended, conditional on revenue from substitutional taxes
providing an equivalent sum,a more difficult question is presented. No direct authority has been found bearing on the
scope and effect of similar constitutional provisions.' Under
such circumstances reference may be made to the evident
purpose of the Constitutional provision in considering
whether a conditional suspension of the levy would violate
the prohibition against repeal.
The provision was adopted in the course of a program
for reorganizing the State's finances, after bitter experiences following overextensions of the public credit. ° Purposes which may be gathered from the provision in the light
of this background are that it was designed (1) to afford
specific protection to bondholders of the State; (2) to improve the credit of the State thereby; (3) to furnish a check
against large and constant increases in the State debt." No
purpose to favor one form of taxation over another can be
Md. Const., Art. III, See. 34.
o See Reports of Comptroller, 1934, p. 38; 1935, p. 22; 1936, p. 20.
See State v. Hendrickson, 15 Md. 205 (1860).
Acts, 1937, Ch. 515 (p. 1224), the Budget Act of 1937.
oAside from a recent decision permitting use of general funds of the
State to pay early installments of interest before the loan taxes are collected and thus saving the constitutionality of the State office building loan.
Bickel v. Nice, 192 Atl. 777 (Md., 1937).
10 Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law, 186-188.
11 The object is "to require the Assembly, when incurring an obligation,
to meet the problem of punctual payment". Bickel v. Nice, supra, note 9.
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gathered from the provision, since the Assembly was given
freedom to determine the form of taxation adopted to service any bond issue.,a Accordingly, bond issues serviced by
gasoline taxes 12 and by inheritance taxes, 18 as well as those
serviced by the real estate tax, have been authorized.
Unless particular State revenues have been provided for
a bond issue, the holder of a State bond has no legal means
of compelling its payment. 4 If, in addition to the revenues
originally appropriated, other sources of revenue are provided, it seems clear that the position of the bondholder has
been materially improved rather than the reverse. The enactment of a new or other form of tax applicable to outstanding bond issues, coupled with a direction to State and
local officials to suspend the property levy only to the extent
that other funds are actually realized, 5 gives the bondholder
two sources out of which his bonds are payable. Thus it
adequately protects him, safeguards the credit of the State,
and does not affect or impair the State policy against issuing bonds without providing funds for their payment.
The suggested conclusion that the purposes of the Constitutional provision are in no substantial degree impaired
by conditional suspension of the property tax is fortified by
consideration of the meaning of the word "repeal". Repeal
has been authoritatively defined as "the abrogation or destruction of a law by a legislative act"."e If the property
levy is not abrogated or destroyed but is continued in existence for the further security of bondholders, provided other
funds do not measure up to expectations, it seems that the
tax has not in fact been "repealed".
,'a Careful bond counsel, passing on the Emergency Bond Issue of 1935,
suggested the possibility that the "annual tax or taxes," required by the
Constitutional provision, might be limited to property taxes. It is believed
that such a construction would import into the provision a requirement not
to be found in the natural meaning of the words used and is, therefore, not
to be anticipated.
" Acts, 1935, Ch. 563, authorizes road bonds in the amount of $3,000,000
to be paid from certain motor vehicle and gasoline taxes. Since the general
credit of the State is not pledged, it is arguable that this is not a "debt
created by the General Assembly", within the meaning of the Constitutional
restriction.
1" Acts, 1935, Ch. 91, provides for a general bond Issue of $8,500,000,
serviced primarily by inheritance taxes and only secondarily by an additional property tax.
' Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 27 L. Ed. 448, 2 S. Ct. 128 (1883);
Sawyer v. Colgan, 102 Calif. 283, 36 Pac. 580, 834 (1894) ; Colbert v. State,
86 Miss. 769, 39 So. 65 (1906) ; Opinion of Justices, 49 Mo. 216 (1872).
" Cf. method of servicing relief bonds in Illinois as described in Michaels
v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N. E. 921 (1934). See also Md. Acts. 1935,
Ch. 91.
" 3 Bouvler's Law Dictionary, 2887.
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Impairing Obligation of Contract
While a law repealing the property tax would violate the
provision of the State Constitution, that provision can itself
be amended. The effect of a statute or constitutional
amendment as impairing contract rights of bondholders,
guaranteed to them under the Federal Constitution, must
therefore be considered.
Outright repeal of the property tax would impair the
obligation of the State's contract and would be held invalid
under the Federal Constitution." Even the adoption of a
State constitutional amendment repealing the tax would, as
applied to outstanding bonds, impair the State's contract.."
A law repealing the tax would be disregarded, and State
officers could be compelled by mandamus to collect and
apply the tax. 9 But if the tax is repealed by a State constitutional amendment, officers cannot be compelled to disregard the amendment; being part of the fundamental law of
the State, it necessarily furnishes the guide to action by
executive officers, and the bondholder will have a right without a remedy.2" While a State constitutional provision
cannot be asserted in violation of the basic Federal law in a
suit against private litigants or municipal corporations, it
is equally true that the State itself, in its sovereign capacity,
cannot be coerced against its own supreme law.2 '
In the leading case in which these views were expressed
by the Supreme Court, Louisiana had, by constitutional
amendment, abolished taxes applicable to bonds, without
providing other revenue.22 Loss of State credit through
such action would make unlikely any effort to follow a similar course here. If adequate substitutional revenue is provided, and the real estate tax kept in reserve, no substantial
right of bondholders has been impaired. Without substantial injury it is not apparent how a bondholder could show
17 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14; Board of Liquidation v. McComb,
92 U. S. 531, 23 L. Ed. 623 (1876) ; Bunch v. Wolerstein, 62 Miss. 56 (1884)
State, ex rel. Judd, v. Cooney, 97 Mont. 75, 32 P. (2d) 851 (1936)
1
Quindry, Bonds and Bondholders, Sec. 86. And see Morton v. Comptroller
General, 4 S. Car. 430 (1873). Cf. Rx parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct.
441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908) ; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 13 S. Ct. 785, 37 L. Ed.
689 (1893).
19 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14; Cf. State of Florida v. Palm Beach
Dist., 121 Fla. 746, 164 So. 851 (1935) ; State of Florida v. Boring, 121 Fla.
781, 164 So. 859 (1935).
19 Board of Liquidation v. McComb, supra, note 17: Cf. AMeriwethor v.
Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. Ed. 197 (1880).
10Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14.
1 Cf. Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14, with State of Florida v. Palm
Beach Dist., supra, note 18, and State of Florida v. Boring. supra, note 18.
12 Louisiana Y. Jumel.
supra, note 14.
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any legal basis for complaint," apart from the question of
the State's sovereign immunity,2 4 nor could the credit of the
State suffer through an amendment affording such complete
protection of the interest of bondholders.
Practical as well as legal considerations, therefore,
would suggest that a Constitutional amendment permitting
repeal of the property tax should be coupled with a saving
clause keeping the levy in reserve for the further security
of outstanding bonds. There remains the possibility of
procuring from bondholders a waiver of the real estate levy
conditional on other revenue proving sufficient.2 5 Bondholders might be induced to have such waivers indorsed on
their bonds in consideration of being granted the additional
security of another specific tax. These and other considerations make it desirable that any plan relating to the realty
tax should be worked out in cooperation with representatives of bondholders or of the bankers who purchased the
bonds and resold them to the public.
That the credit of the bonds would not be impaired by
the change is indicated by the credit now enjoyed by the
Emergency Bond Issue of 1935.26 Bonds issued under that
act, payable primarily out of special taxes and only secondarily from the property tax, which is not resorted to as
long as the other revenue is sufficient, are selling at prices
equal to those of bonds secured primarily by the property
tax.
Effect Upon Gross Receipts Taxes
The gross receipts taxes on utilities involve constitutional conceptions which are today in a state of some uncertainty.2 7 It was formerly the rule that a tax on gross
23 State of Florida v. Boring, supra, note 18; Storen v. Sexton, 200 N. E.
251 (Ind., 1936). Cf. Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432,
See also 5 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.), Sec. 2218;
79 L. Ed. 912 (1935).
Wood on Mandamus (3rd Ed.), p. 36. A party seeking to have a statute
declared unconstitutional must show that he is actually injured by its
operation. Louisville R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 59 L. Ed.
379 (1915) ; Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 30 S. Ct. 594, 54 L. Ed.
868 (1910)
24 Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, note 14; Carolina Glass Co. v. South Carolina, 240 U. S. 305, 36 S. Ct. 293, 60 L. Ed. 658 (1916).
11 The right to raise Constitutional questions may be waived. Booth
Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 271 U. S. 208, 46 S. Ct. 491, 70 L.
Ed. 908 (1926).
'Acts 1935, Ch. 91.
Cf. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 48 S. Ct. 366, 67 L. Ed.
682 (1923), and New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338, 50
S. Ct. 111, 74 L. Ed. 463 (1980), with Potomac Ilec. Power Co. v. Hazen.
90 F. (2d) 406 (1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 11 (Oct. 11, 1937).
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receipts from interstate business," or a franchise tax measured partly by gross receipts from interstate business,"
was invalid as a burden on commerce unless it could be
regarded as a property tax or in lieu of a property tax on
the value of the company's intangible property or franchises. ° Changes in the personnel of the United States
Supreme Court since its last decision indicate that a close
division of opinion may exist on the validity of certain gross
receipts taxes. 1 Within the last month the Court has upheld a franchise tax on a foreign corporation which was
measured by its total authorized capital, 2 and this was
regarded as a deviation from previous views of the Court.8"
In Maryland the gross receipts tax is levied in addition
to property taxes, except in the case of domestic railroad
companies.3 4 It therefore, under the former rule, could not
be collected as applied to interstate receipts, unless limited
to the equivalent of a tax on the companies' property,8 5 and
the taxing authorities have in practice limited it to receipts
from local business." It would seem, therefore, that repeal
of the property tax will not reduce present tax collections
under the gross receipts law except possibly from domestic
railroad companies.
2' Pullman Co. v. Richardson, supra, note 27.
21 New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, supra, note 27.
80 United States Ex. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 32 S. Ct. 211, 56
L. Ed. 459 (1912). Or the tax may be validly imposed in substitution for
"the ordinary tax upon property", that is, property both tangible and intangible. See Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 15 S. Ct. 268, 360, 39
L. Ed. 311 (1895).
31Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented in the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.
case and Mr. Justice Stone took no part in the decision. Justices Hughes,
Roberts, Cardozo and Black have subsequently been appointed to the Court.
32 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 58 S. Ct. 75 (decided Nov. 8, 1937).
88 See Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45
S. Ct. 477, 69 L. Ed. 916 (1925), and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278
U. S. 460, 49 S. Ct. 204, 73 L. Ed. 454 (1929), distinguished in the opinion in
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, supra, note 32, on the ground that in those
cases the corporation had already been admitted to the State. See also
Prentice-Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Par. 7029.
8, Md. Code, Art. 81, Sec. 91.
'15See doubt expressed in Postal Tel. Co. v. Harford Co., 131 Md. 96, 101
Even though imposed in addition to property taxes, the
AtI. 600 (1917).
gross receipts levy (which is expressly declared to be a franchise tax) is
clearly valid when measured by receipts from intrastate business alone,
unless it burdens Interstate commerce. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 403, 56 S. Ct. 222, 80 L. Ed. 760 (1936).
30 A recent sampling of returns of utilities under the gross receipts tax
shows that they customarily report only a small fraction of the statutory
estimate of their total receipts in Maryland, ranging from one-fourth to
one-eighth. The statute in terms requires that the tax be paid on that
proportion of total gross receipts of the company which the mileage in
Maryland bearO to the total mileage. See Md. Code, Art. 81, Sec. 91 (b).
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Conclusions
Broadly speaking, private persons, unless they are materially injured by a proposed change in State policy, should
not be permitted to control the form of taxation which the
legislature may see fit to impose. Any waiver of the State's
sovereign powers and immunities should not be extended
beyond the necessities of the occasion upon which the
waiver is made. Accordingly, if bondholders are adequately
protected by a substitutional tax and by keeping the property tax in reserve (as was done in the case of the Emergency Bond Issue of 1935), they should not be permitted to
obstruct such changes as may be desired by the people of
the State.
It is believed that formal breach of the State's contract
against repeal would not result from conditional suspension
of the levy. Nor could a substantial impairment of the
contract obligation be shown. Litigation by a minority
bondholder is always possible, however, and for this reason
a Constitutional amendment might offer a more desirable
procedure as tending to make the State's legal position
impregnable. 7
No suggestion is made that a breach of contract would
be desirable or justifiable on the ground of the State's immunity from suit. On the contrary, the necessity of preserving the State's credit is an adequate guaranty against
unfair dealing with the State's bondholders and bankers.
87 It has been assumed that Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights, as
amended in 1915, will furnish no obstacle to repeal or suspension of the
State property tax. Prior to the 1915 amendment it was held that State
and local taxes on tangible personal property and on improvements could
not be repealed as long as these taxes are retained on land, since the requirement of uniformity would be violated. Wells v. Hyattsville, 77 Md.
125, 26 Ati. 357 (1893). Doubtless the amendment permits separate treatment of different classes of property, although an undefined requirement
of uniformity remains. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission,
159 Md. 334, 151 Atl. 29 (1930) ; aff'd 283 U. S. 291, 51 S. Ct. 434, 75 L. Ed.
1042 (1931). A constitutional amendment would avoid all question of conflict with Article 15.

